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There are frequent complaints that U.S.
income inequality has increased in recent
decades. Estimates of rising inequality that are
widely cited in the media are often based on fed-
eral income tax return data. Those data appear to
show that the share of U.S. income going to the
top 1 percent (those people with the highest
incomes) has increased substantially since the
1970s.
However, there have been large changes in
U.S. tax rules over time that have made a dra-
matic difference on what is reported as income
on individual tax returns. Tax changes induced
thousands of businesses to switch from filing
under the corporate tax system to filing under
the individual tax system. Corporate executives
switched from accepting stock options taxed as
capital gains to nonqualified stock options taxed
as salaries. The huge growth in tax-favored sav-
ings plans, such as 401(k)s, has resulted in bil-
lions of dollars of investment income disappear-
ing from tax returns. Meanwhile, studies of
inequality that are based on tax return data usu-
ally exclude transfer payments, which results in
exaggerating the shares of income received by
those at the top by ignoring growing amounts of
income at the bottom.
Measurements of inequality have also been
affected by large reductions in income tax rates,
particularly in 1986. Estimates by many econo-
mists indicate that the reported income of high-
income taxpayers is very responsive to tax rates.
When top tax rates on wages or capital gains fall,
reported incomes rise, and a larger fraction of the
incomes of those at the top show up on tax
returns. International comparisons show that
reported income shares of those at the top have
risen the most where top tax rates have been cut
the most (the United States, the United Kingdom,
and India) and have risen the least where top tax
rates have remained very high (France and Japan).
In sum, studies based on tax return data pro-
vide highly misleading comparisons of changes to
the U.S. income distribution because of dramatic
changes in tax rules and tax reporting in recent
decades. Aside from stock option windfalls during
the late-1990s stock-market boom, there is little
evidence of a significant or sustained increase in
the inequality of U.S. incomes, wages, consump-
tion, or wealth over the past 20 years.
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Introduction
Major newspapers and magazines repeated-
ly report that the share of national income
received by the top 1 percent in the United
States (the roughly 1.3 million tax returns with
the highest reported incomes in the United
States) has increased enormously and continu-
ously since the 1970s. Of the many difficult sta-
tistics used to influence public perception and
policy, this one is surely the most often repeat-
ed and the least often understood. 
In February 2006, The Economist noted that
Thomas Piketty (of Ecole Normale Supérieure
in Paris) and Emmanuel Saez (of the
University of California at Berkeley) had “cal-
culated a long-run distribution of income in
America from information on tax returns.
Their latest study shows that the top 1 percent
of Americans now receive 15 percent of all
income, up from about 8 percent in the 1960s
and 1970s.”1 In June, another story in The
Economist cited the same study and concluded:
“The one truly continuous trend over the past
25 years has been toward greater concentra-
tion of income at the very top.”2
After 35 years of writing on economic
issues, I do not recall any other private and
unofficial estimates that were as widely and
uncritically repeated as the Piketty-Saez esti-
mates on income shares of the top 1 percent.
The influential New York Times columnist
Paul Krugman dubs Piketty and Saez “the
leading experts on long-term trends in
inequality,” and quotes them endlessly.3
Searching Google for “Emmanuel Saez” in
early October turned up 51,700 entries,
including 871 that also involved the New York
Times. Similar searches yielded 814 joint ref-
erences to Saez and the Washington Post, 568
for the Wall Street Journal, 375 for the Financial
Times, and 319 for USA Today. 
Other economists have assembled estimates
of income distribution based on income tax
return data, including economists at the
Congressional Budget Office. Various estimates
of the ratio of top incomes to total incomes
have differed substantially because of what is
counted as income for the top 1 percent (the
numerator) and what is counted as total
income for the nation (the denominator). By
adopting the broadest conceivable measure of
income at the top and the narrowest possible
measure of everyone else’s income, the share
going to the top 1 percent can be made to
appear deceptively large and growing.4
The Piketty-Saez figures are by far the most
popular income distribution estimates among
news reporters, editorial writers, and colum-
nists. The authors’ original study in 2001 cov-
ered the years from 1913 to 1998 (subsequent-
ly updated through 2001), using detailed
micro data from the Internal Revenue Service.5
They have also produced more recent estimates
for 2002 to 2004 that were not taken from
these micro files but “were estimated from the
published IRS tables,” which show tax returns
grouped by broad income bracket. Piketty and
Saez claim that “the thresholds [defining the
top 1 percent and other fractiles or groups] are
usually very close to one of the income bracket
thresholds.”6 If so, they argue, “one can use
standard Pareto interpolation techniques in
order to estimate the top fractiles’ income
thresholds and income levels of the tax unit
distribution of net income.”7 In other words,
Piketty-Saez income shares for 2002–2004 are
just estimates, rather than actual IRS data.
This paper reviews the estimates of the
income shares of the top 1 percent, including
the Piketty-Saez and CBO figures. It finds
that income equality studies that are based
on data reported on federal tax returns can
be highly misleading. Table 1 lists seven
major factors that have seriously distorted
measurements of income inequality in recent
decades. The following sections examine
those factors and discuss the extent to which
they have affected published inequality data. 
Tax Rate Cuts and the
Conversion of Corporate to
Individual Income
The Economist has depicted the apparent
rise in the top 1 percent’s share as a “truly
continuous trend.”8 But that is not what the
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data actually show. Instead, the reported
income share of the top 1 percent has
changed sharply in periods when tax rules
have changed. The 2001 paper by Piketty and
Saez clearly explained that, “a significant part
of the gain [in top income shares] is concen-
trated in two years, 1987 and 1988, just after
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.”9
The top 1 percent’s share jumped from 9.1
percent in 1985 and 1986, when the top tax
rate was 50 percent, to 13.2 percent in 1988
when the top tax rate dropped to 28 percent.
That was not a sudden two-year spurt in
inequality. It was a sudden increase in the
amount of high income reported on individ-
ual income tax returns rather than being con-
cealed, deferred, or reported on corporate
income tax returns. Dramatic changes in tax
laws have changed the way that income has
been reported on tax returns over time.
As discussed below, many studies of the
elasticity (responsiveness) of reported
income to changes in marginal tax rates by
Emmanuel Saez and others show that when
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Factor Main Effect of Factor
Business Income. Shifting of business Great expansion of reported income at the top.
from corporate tax returns to individual 
tax returns after individual tax rates fell.
Personal Savings. Large expansion in Reduced reported investment income among
the use of tax-favored savings vehicles middle-income taxpayers, which raised the
including 401(k)s and IRAs. top’s apparent income share.
Transfer Payments. Large growth in Reduced the total income denominator
transfer payments for low-income of income distribution in estimates
families—income that is excluded of income shares at the top.
from most tax-return-based studies. 
Capital Gains. Boom and bust cycle of Comparisons of income shares changes
capital gains realizations and stock and stock market trends between two
option exercises as a result of tax rate. atypical years need not represent sustained
trends.
Stock Options. Change in stock options Increased top incomes in comparison of
for executives and workers from a type capital gains and ordinary income with 
taxed as capital gains to a type taxed as the 1970s in those studies that exclude 
salary in response to changes in tax rates. capital gains.
Tax Rate Changes. Marginal tax rates Marginal tax rate changes may have large
changed in 1981, 1986, 1990, 1993, effects on reported income at the top, in
2001, and 2003. Income reported by situations where actual income may not
high-income taxpayers is highly have changed very much.
responsive to such rate changes due to changes 
in avoidance, evasion, and other behaviors. 
AGI Gap. The AGI gap of unreported May have exaggerated the apparent
income on tax returns has grown growth of top incomes due to greater
since 1988. underreporting of other incomes.
Table 1 
Factors Affecting Estimates of Income from Individual Tax Returns 
the highest tax rates are reduced, the amount
of income reported on tax returns rises. The
two-year spurt in income reported by the top
1 percent is therefore exactly what econo-
mists would have expected to happen after
the top tax rate on income was cut from 50
percent in 1986, to 37.5 percent in 1987, and
to 28 percent in 1988.10
One obvious reason for the surge in top
incomes after 1986 is well known to econo-
mists, including Saez, yet never mentioned by
journalists who cite these figures. “It seems
clear,” Saez wrote in 2004, “that the sharp,
and unprecedented, increase in incomes
from 1986 to 1988 is related to the large
decrease in marginal tax rates that happened
exactly during those years.”11 One reason
that happened, he explained, was shifting of
income from corporate tax returns (business-
es reporting as C-corporations) to individual
tax returns (businesses reporting as S-corpo-
rations and other business structures): 
Before the 1980s, S-corporation income
was extremely small, as indeed the stan-
dard C-corporation form was more
advantageous for high-income individ-
ual owners because the top individual tax
rate was much higher than the corporate
tax rate and taxes on capital gains were
relatively low. S-corporation income
increases sharply from 1986 to 1988 and
increases slowly afterwards. The sharp
increase in S-corporation income just
after TRA1986 certainly reflects in large
part a shift in the status of corporations
from C to S status to take advantage of
the lower individual rates.12
Even before the 1986 tax act, the phased-in
reductions in tax rates under the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 “produced a sudden
burst of S-corporation income (which was neg-
ligible up to 1981) . . . . Almost all the increase
in top incomes from 1981 to 1984 . . . is also
due to the surge in S-corporation income,”
according to Saez.13
In the late 1970s, the top individual income
tax rate was 70 percent on taxable income above
about $100,000 (for single filers).14 Corporate
tax rates were lower—46 percent on income
above $100,000 and reduced rates below that
level.15 The much higher tax rates on businesses
filing under the individual tax code provided a
strong incentive for those with substantial busi-
ness income (such as professionals and farm-
ers) to file as regular C-corporations. 
When individual tax rates were reduced after
the 1981 tax act and again after the 1986 tax act,
it provided a strong incentive to shift from
reporting business income on corporate
returns to individual returns by filing as S-cor-
porations, limited liability companies (LLCs),
partnerships, or proprietorships. In all these
cases, business profits flow through to individ-
ual returns rather than being taxed at the cor-
porate level on corporate tax returns. 
One result is that those attempting to mea-
sure incomes by what has been reported on
individual tax returns may erroneously view
these large increases in income at the top as real
changes in American’s incomes. Instead, they
were simply the result of a bookkeeping
change in the way business incomes were
reported. Switching income from corporate
returns to individual returns did not make the
rich any richer—it simply made more of their
income show up as “individual income” in the
CBO and Piketty-Saez estimates.
Figure 1 shows that business profits
accounted for more than 27 percent of the
income of the top 1 percent reported on indi-
vidual tax returns since 2002, up from just
7.8 percent in 1981. Most of the widely
reported increase in the top 1 percent’s share
was simply due to this income shifting from
the corporate to individual tax returns after
individual income tax rates came down. As
Internal Revenue Service economist Kelly
Luttrell explained:
The long-term growth of S-corporation
returns was encouraged by four legislative
acts: the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, and
the Small Business Protection Act of 1996
[which allowed banks to file as Subchapter
4
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S corporations]. Filings of S-corporation
returns have increased at an annual rate of
nearly 9.0 percent since the enactment of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. During the
same period, taxable [Subchapter-C] cor-
porations have experienced an average
annual decline of 1.3 percent.16
The broader problem of relying on tax return
data while ignoring tax-caused shifts in income
reporting has been recognized by economists
Jagadeesh Sivadasan and Joel Slemrod. They
have warned against “studies of wage inequality
that rely on data that could be polluted by tax-
induced income-shifting behavior.”17 Some of
the most dramatic reactions to lower U.S.
income tax rates in the 1980s involved three
types of “income shifting”: (1) shifts between
corporate and individual income tax returns, as
noted, (2) shifts between incentive stock options
and restricted stock taxed as capital gains and
nonqualified stock options taxed as salaries, and
(3) shifts between investment income reported
on tax returns and investment income diverted
to tax-deferred savings accounts.  
Here I only adjust for the first variety of
income shifting, but Table 2 shows that this
adjustment is sufficient to leave almost no
increase in the top 1 percent’s income share
between 1988 and 2003. The first column of
Table 2 shows the Piketty-Saez data illustrat-
ing an apparent rise in the top 1 percent’s
income share. (Note that their estimate for
2004 appears somewhat anomalous, as dis-
cussed below).
The second column of Table 2 shows the
Piketty-Saez estimates of the top 1 percent’s
share of income adjusted to exclude the
increasingly huge share of income on individ-
ual returns coming from S-corporations, LLCs,
and other businesses. The growing number
and size of businesses filing under the individ-
ual income tax made little difference in the top
1 percent’s share until 1987. By 2004, however,
this type of income shifting added 4 percent-
age points to the top 1 percent’s share. In short,
shifting between the corporate and individual
tax systems has accounted for more than half of
the apparent increase in the top 1 percent’s
income share since 1986.
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Source: Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States,” as updated at
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez.
This bookkeeping change related to where
businesses report their income is only one factor
of many that distorts often-cited measures of
income inequality. But this factor alone is reason
enough to make it illegitimate to use individual
income tax data to compare shares of income
over time, particularly before and after the monu-
mental tax law changes of 1981 and 1986.
Increasingly Invisible
Investment Income
A variety of factors have served to depress the
denominator of the ratio of top incomes to total
incomes in recent decades. If large amounts of
income for those near the bottom and in the mid-
dle are not reported on tax returns, it means that
the income share of those at the top is being exag-
gerated. A very important factor in this regard is
that prior to the 1980s nearly all income from
investments (dividends, interest, and capital
gains) was reported on individual tax returns.18
But in recent years, an increasingly large share of
middle-income investment returns have been
sheltered inside tax-favored accounts, such as
401(k)s, Individual Retirement Arrangements
(IRAs), and 529 college savings plans. Investment
income accruing in tax-favored savings plans is
not recorded on income tax returns.
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Table 2
Estimated Share of Income of Top 1 Percent
Piketty and With Business Portion due to
Year Saez Estimates Income Excluded Business Income
1981 8.0 7.4 0.6
1982 8.4 7.7 0.7
1983 8.6 7.8 0.8
1984 8.9 8.0 0.9
1985 9.1 8.0 1.1
1986 9.1 8.1 1.0
1987 10.8 8.9 2.8
1988 13.2 10.1 3.1
1989 12.6 9.8 2.8
1990 13.0 10.1 2.9
1991 12.2 9.4 2.8
1992 13.5 10.3 3.2
1993 12.8 9.8 3.0
1994 12.9 9.4 3.5
1995 13.5 9.9 3.6
1996 14.1 10.4 3.7
1997 14.8 10.9 3.9
1998 15.3 11.3 4.0
1999 15.9 11.8 4.1
2000 16.5 12.4 4.1
2001 15.4 11.3 4.1
2002 14.6 11.0 3.6
2003 14.9 10.8 4.1
2004 16.1 11.5 4.6
Source: Based on Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States” as updated at
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez.
Note: Income is adjusted gross income, plus adjustments, minus capital gains and transfer payments.
The earnings build-up inside tax-favored
savings plans is income in exactly the same
sense that taxable capital gains, dividends,
and interest are income. However, this invest-
ment income is no longer visible on tax
returns, as was most investment income of
middle-income families in the 1970s and
before. This factor has thus exaggerated the
increase in top income shares by omitting a
growing fraction of the denominator. By
contrast, the bulk of investment income of
those in the top 1 percent is still reported on
tax returns, because most of it is taxable and
not in the various tax-favored accounts such
as IRAs and 401(k)s.
When various tax-favored accounts were
being created and expanded in recent decades,
there was a lively debate about the extent to
which contributions to such accounts would
represent new savings or income shifting—
transferring existing savings from taxable
accounts to tax-deferred or tax-exempt
accounts. There was no serious dispute, how-
ever, that there would be considerable income
shifting for many years. Yet this variety of
income shifting, despite its vast scale, has not
previously been brought into discussions
about the validity of using income tax data to
estimate multi-decade changes in the distribu-
tion of total income—including income from
savings as well as work. 
Piketty and Saez’s 2001 paper did men-
tion retirement savings accounts, but only in
the context of one form of investment
income (dividends) and only with respect to
top income shares (the numerator). They
observed: 
The ratio of dividends reported on indi-
vidual tax returns to personal dividends
in the National Accounts has declined
continuously . . . to less than 40 percent
in 1995. But the point is that this decline
is due mostly to the growth of funded
pension plans and retirement savings
accounts through which individuals
receive dividends that are never reported
as dividends on income tax returns.  For
the highest income earners, this addi-
tional source of dividends is likely to be
very small relative to dividends reported
on tax returns.19
Yet such invisible dividends are not small
for those who are not the highest income
earners. And that is also true of the tax-
deferred or tax-exempt capital gains and
interest income of middle-income savers that
are also unreported on income tax returns.  
Economist James Poterba of M.I.T. esti-
mates that those in the (middle) 28 percent tax
bracket held 32.1 percent of their assets in tax-
deferred accounts in 1998.20 By contrast,
Federal Reserve Board economist Arthur
Kennickel estimates that in 2001 the top 1 per-
cent of wealth holders had only 5.5 percent of
their assets in such unreported form.21
“At the end of 2002,” notes the CBO, “$10.1
trillion was in tax-deferred retirement plans, of
which $9 trillion was taxable upon withdraw-
al.”22 If that $10.1 trillion earned a middling 7
percent return, the investment income alone
would be $707 billion in the first year—$707 bil-
lion that could not appear in tax-based studies
of income earned by those who own those
accounts. Much of it should eventually show
up as ordinary income upon withdrawal, but
usually not for many years (or generations,
since heirs do not have to tap an inherited IRA
until they reach age 70.5). 
Before a variety of tax-favored savings
plans became commonplace, virtually every
dollar of investment income from the savings
of middle-income taxpayers was reported as
taxable income, and it was therefore counted
as income in studies that use tax returns to
estimate income distribution in the 1970s.
Today, by contrast, most investment returns
from the saving of middle-income taxpayers
are rarely or never taxed. This makes it singu-
larly inappropriate to use tax data to com-
pare income shares before and after the
explosion of tax-deferred accounts.   Doing
so makes it appear as though middle-income
investors had a far larger share of capital
gains, dividends, and interest income in the
1970s than they did in the 1990s, simply
because those investments used to be fully
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taxable and now are not. The actual increase
of incomes among middle-income house-
holds since the 1970s is therefore greatly
understated in tax data because an increas-
ingly huge portion of their investment
income is no longer reported on tax returns.
The resulting statistical illusion shrinks the
denominator of the ratio of top income to
total income over time and thereby increases
the apparent increase in the income share
revealed within the top 1 percent of individ-
ual income tax returns.
Just like income shifting from the corpo-
rate to the individual tax system, the income
shifting of middle-income savings from tax-
able to tax-deferred accounts has led to an
understatement of the amount and growth
of investment income of millions of taxpay-
ers in all studies that use only the income
reported on tax returns to estimate actual
income, including the Piketty-Saez and CBO
studies. This factor is not as easy to quantify
as income shifting between corporate and
individual tax returns, but it clearly presents
a huge and rapidly growing problem with
respect to all efforts to estimate income
trends from tax returns. And it makes it ludi-
crous to compare today’s tax-based income
distribution estimates with those of the
1970s, when tax-deferred accounts for mid-
dle-income taxpayers were virtually nonexis-
tent. Middle-income taxpayers appeared to
have a larger share of before-tax income in
the tax return data of the 1970s simply
because their yearly income from their invest-
ments was taxed, and now most of it is sim-
ply invisible on tax returns.
There are other types of income that have
disappeared from tax returns. The basic mea-
sure of income on tax returns, adjusted gross
income (AGI), does not capture everything that
might reasonably be considered income. In
addition, tax returns do not capture all of AGI,
which is evident when one considers that esti-
mates of AGI based on personal income data
are larger than AGI reported on tax returns. The
Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that
this “AGI gap” rose from 9.7 percent in 1988
(when the top tax rate was 28 percent), to 12.7
percent in 1994, and to 14.4 percent in 2003.23
Assuming for illustration that the top 1 percent
accounted for 5 percent of the AGI gap, that
gap was too small in 1988 to have made much
difference in their income share. By 1999, on
the other hand, that same assumption would
reduce the top 1 percent’s share by nearly a per-
centage point. The larger size of the AGI gap
before and after the Tax Reform of 1986 is just
one of many reasons why it is risky to compare
income data from tax returns between greatly
different tax regimes. 
Top 1 Percent of What?
Media reports about the supposed rise in
the income share at the top, including refer-
ences to the Piketty-Saez studies, never both-
er to ask the most basic question of all: the
top 1 percent of what?
Most people assume that the “top 1 per-
cent” and other income shares refer to the top
percentiles of household or family income. New
York Times columnist Paul Krugman wrote:
“According to Piketty and Saez . . . in 1998 the
top 0.01 percent received more than 3 percent
of all income. That meant that the 13,000
richest families in America had almost as
much income as the 20 million poorest house-
holds.”24 Yet the Piketty-Saez figures do not
refer to households nor families (much less
both)—they refer to “tax units,” which can be
much different.
Piketty and Saez point out that “average
household income is about 28 percent high-
er than average tax unit income.”25 In some
cases the differences are much larger than
that. Two unmarried working people living
together constitute one household but two
tax units; their household income could be
twice as large as their income per tax unit. Or
consider that children with investment
income above $750 are required to file tax
returns, with the result that they show up as
extremely poor “tax units” in the Piketty-Saez
figures, even though they are unlikely to be
living in poor families.
Pointing to the Piketty-Saez data, the pre-
8
Middle-income
taxpayers
appeared to have
a larger share of
before-tax income
simply because
their yearly
income from
their investments
was taxed, and
now most of it is
simply invisible
on tax returns.
ceding remark by Paul Krugman claimed the
13,000 richest “families” received “more than
3 percent of all income.” But these are not
“families,” they are tax units. Also note that
Piketty and Saez do not measure “all
income.” The authors do not include benefit
payments from Social Security, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, the Earned
Income Tax Credit, Supplemental Security
Income, or other government programs.
Since not all income is counted, such figures
cannot possibly tell us what share of all
income was received by those at the top.   
In 1970, wages and salaries accounted for 65.8
percent of personal income, while transfer pay-
ments accounted for just 8.5 percent.26 In 2005,
wages and salaries accounted for 55.3 percent of
personal income, while transfers accounted for
14.5 percent. Because transfer payments have rep-
resented a rising share of total income, ignoring
them makes the top 1 percent’s share appear to
increase because a growing fraction of other peo-
ple’s income is not counted. Yet there is no logical
reason to arbitrarily exclude such benefits as
Social Security from measured income, while
including comparable benefits from private
retirement plans. 
The top 1 percent’s share of income is a
ratio—the top 1 percent’s income is the numer-
ator, and that plus everyone else’s income is the
denominator. Excluding transfer payments
from the denominator makes the top 1 per-
cent’s share appear larger than it really is, but it
also makes the top 1 percent’s share appear to
rise more than it has because transfer pay-
ments have accounted for a rising share of
actual total income (the denominator).
Income Share Trends
Since the 1980s
Table 3 presents data covering 1981 to
2004 to highlight the effects of transfer pay-
ments and capital gains on the top 1 per-
cent’s income share. Column 1 in the table
shows CBO data for the income share of the
top 1 percent including capital gains.27 To
make these CBO figures more comparable to
those of Piketty and Saez, column 2 uses cap-
ital gains data from Piketty and Saez to
approximate what CBO estimates would be if
they excluded gains. Including realized capi-
tal gains causes large variability in the data—
it adds 4.3 percentage points to the top 1 per-
cent’s share in 1986 and 2.6 points in 2000. 
Note that the CBO data includes transfer
payments. Thus, the adjusted CBO data in
column 2 can be compared to the Piketty-
Saez data in column 4, which also excludes
capital gains and includes transfer payments.
Neither of the two CBO series show any
significant increase in the top 1 percent’s
share between the late 1980s and the most
recent years. Those determined to find an
upward “trend” can always select some pair
of years to create that impression. They
would simply start with a year in which the
number was relatively low (such as 1989 or
1994 in the Piketty-Saez series), end with a
year that was unusually high, and show the
percentage change between them.  
The CBO series that includes capital gains
rises in the late 1990s because of the stock mar-
ket boom. But even the series without capital
gains rises with the stock market boom, which
likely reflects the proliferation of nonqualified
stock options granted after 1986, most of
which were exercised long after stocks recovered
from the 1991 recession. The 1993 tax law con-
tributed to the rise of such stock options
among top executives because corporations
could deduct the cost of exercised options but
not salaries above $1 million.
The last two columns of Table 3 are the
most significant, and they are also shown in
Figure 2. Column 4 (Piketty-Saez with transfer
payments) simply adds transfer payments
(from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ per-
sonal income data) to the Piketty-Saez mea-
sure of total income. (This includes the
refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit.) This results in reducing the top 1 per-
cent’s share of total income by rising amounts
over time, reaching three percentage points by
2004.28 Since total income grows more rapidly
in this data series, due to the rapid growth of
transfer payments, it diminishes any upward
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trend in the top 1 percent’s share. The increase
in the top 1 percent’s share from 1988 to 2003
was just 0.8 percentage points when transfers
are included in the denominator, which com-
pares to 1.7 percentage points when they are
not. Similarly, the 1988 to 2003 increase in the
top 1 percent’s share in the CBO series was
negligible because the CBO data includes
transfer payments.
Column 5 of Table 3 (and the bottom line
in Figure 2) adds transfer payments to the
denominator and subtracts business income
from the numerator. That leaves nonbusiness
income of the top 1 percent—mostly salaries,
exercised stock options, and dividends—as a
percent of total income, including transfers.
The point of this exercise is the same as in
Table 2, where we showed that about half of
10
Table 3
Estimates of the Pretax Income Share of the Top 1 Percent
5. Piketty-Saez
(including 
transfers and
1. CBO 2. CBO 3. Piketty-Saez 4. Piketty-Saez excluding
(including (excluding (excluding (including business
capital gains) capital gains) capital gains) transfers) income)
1981 9.1 8.2 8.0 6.9 6.3
1982 9.6 8.3 8.4 7.1 6.5
1983 10.3 8.6 8.6 7.2 6.5
1984 10.9 9.1 8.9 7.6 6.8
1985 11.5 9.4 9.1 7.8 6.9
1986 14.0 9.7 9.1 7.8 6.9
1987 11.2 10.2 10.8 9.2 7.6
1988 13.3 12.0 13.2 11.3 8.9
1989 12.5 11.4 12.6 10.8 8.4
1990 12.1 11.4 13.0 11.1 8.6
1991 11.2 10.7 12.2 10.2 7.8
1992 12.3 11.7 13.5 11.2 8.5
1993 11.9 11.1 12.8 10.5 8.0
1994 12.1 11.4 12.9 10.6 7.7
1995 12.5 11.6 13.5 11.1 8.1
1996 13.8 12.3 14.1 11.6 8.5
1997 14.9 13.0 14.8 12.2 9.0
1998 15.7 13.6 15.3 12.8 9.4
1999 16.7 14.4 15.9 13.3 9.9
2000 17.8 15.2 16.5 13.9 10.5
2001 14.8 13.6 15.4 12.8 9.4
2002 13.5 12.5 14.6 12.0 9.0
2003 14.3 13.1 14.9 12.1 8.8
2004 NA NA 16.1 13.1 9.4
Source: Based on Congressional Budget Office, “Historical Effective Tax Rates: 1979 to 2003,” December 2005,
Table 1C; and Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States,” as updated at
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez.
Note: Column 2 is Congressional Budget Offfice data as adjusted by the author to exclude capital gains based on
the percentage of income attributed to capital gains by Piketty-Saez. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 include transfer pay-
ments. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 include business income.
the rise in the top 1 percent’s seemingly
increased share of income (excluding trans-
fers) was the result of income shifting from
the corporate to the individual tax.
After making just those two adjustments,
the apparent increase of 1.7 percentage points
in the top 1 percent’s share from 1988 to
2003 in the unadjusted Piketty-Saez esti-
mates becomes no increase. Thus, the
Piketty-Saez results that show an increase
depend on two factors: (1) excluding transfer
payments from income, and (2) treating the
income shifting between the corporate and
individual tax as an actual income increase
rather than merely a matter of choosing to
report income on different tax forms.
To summarize the results so far: Aside from
the two-year spike in the 1980s that Piketty
and Saez mentioned, which was due to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, there has been no sus-
tained increase in the top 1 percent’s share
through 2003 that cannot be entirely
explained by either (1) the arbitrary exclusion
of transfer payments, or (2) income shifting
between corporate and individual tax returns.
What about 2004? The unadjusted
Piketty-Saez estimates suggest that the top 1
percent’s share in 2004 of 16.1 percent was
nearly back to the level during the stock mar-
ket peak in 2000 of 16.5 percent. However, if
we set aside the increased share from busi-
ness income (28.4 percent of the total in
2004), the top 1 percent’s remaining 9.4 per-
cent share of total income in 2004 was more
than a percentage point lower than the 2000
peak. Yet the 2004 figure, if it is sustained, is
nonetheless a bit higher than the peak
reached during the late 1980s.29
When transfer payments are counted as
what they are—income—and any adjustment is
made for the rising share of business income
reported among the top 1 percent of “individ-
ual” incomes, it is clear that most of the sup-
posedly continuous upward trend in the top 1
percent’s share happened during the period
between the horrific stagflation of the early
1980s (which did slash top investor incomes)
and the spurious 1986 to 1988 spurt in report-
ed incomes due to the 1986 tax act. There is also
a four-year increase after the capital gains tax
11
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Source: Author's calculations and data in Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the
United States,” as updated at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez.
rate was cut in 1997, which will be discussed
below in connection with capital gains, stock
options, and CEO pay.   
Before-Tax and After-Tax
Income
The exclusion of transfer payments, as dis-
cussed in the prior section, is particularly inap-
propriate for those economist such as Paul
Krugman who cite the Piketty-Saez estimates to
argue for greater redistribution of income. To
the extent that high tax rates on the rich might
actually be collected (an issue discussed below),
such taxes might equalize after-tax incomes—
even though they would not necessarily redis-
tribute a dollar to the poor. Because the Piketty-
Saez figures discussed above are before taxes,
Krugman’s rhetorical attempts to link those fig-
ures to “Bush tax cuts” are clearly irrelevant.30
The CBO’s tax-return-based estimates of
income distribution suffer most of the same
shortcomings as the Piketty-Saez estimates,
including business income being shifted to
individual tax returns. But the CBO is unique
in providing after-tax estimates, which are clear-
ly more relevant to actual differences in living
standards. CBO estimates of the top 1 per-
cent’s share of after-tax income (which are not
shown in Table 3) jumped from 9.9 percent in
1984 to 13.2 percent in 1986 and 12 percent in
1988.31 Unsurprisingly, the top 1 percent’s
reported income also rose with the stock mar-
ket boom of 1997–2000 (when the capital
gains tax rate was cut). By 2001–2003, however,
the top 1 percent’s after-tax share had dropped
back to about where it had been in 1988: 12.6
percent in 2001, 11.5 percent in 2002, and 12.2
percent in 2003. It is impossible to find any
“continuous” upward trend in such figures, as
The Economist suggested occurred, despite mas-
sive income shifting from the corporate to the
individual tax. That may explain why the CBO
estimates have received far less media attention
than the Piketty-Saez figures.
To the extent that more generous transfer
payments to the poor do not discourage their
efforts to earn, such payments could redistrib-
ute incomes from those who earned them to
those who did not. Because the Piketty-Saez
data exclude transfer payments, however, their
measure of income distribution cannot possi-
bly be directly affected by anti-poverty pro-
grams (or by taxes).   Even doubling the size of
means-tested transfer payments cannot help
solve inequality if “inequality” is defined to
exclude transfer payments. 
The CBO, by contrast, does make an effort
to determine the distribution of disposable
income—including subtracting taxes from
higher incomes and adding transfer payments
to lower incomes. But the CBO’s “comprehen-
sive” measure of expanded income includes
interest on tax-exempt municipal bonds.32 That
introduces another difficulty with comparing
data before and after the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
Interest on tax-exempt bonds was not reported
on tax returns before 1987. Thus tax return
data before that date cannot reveal a very popu-
lar source of income among affluent taxpayers
in the 1970s, when top tax rates on taxable
investments were 70 percent or more. That is
another reason why recent income share mea-
sures based on tax returns cannot be sensibly
compared with those of 1985, much less those
of 1973 or 1979 (years commonly selected for
comparison because they were cyclical peaks
preceding miserable years).
CBO’s estimates of the effective individual
income tax rate paid by the top 1 percent,
including taxes on capital gains and divi-
dends, are also interesting. The effective rate
was 21.8 percent in 1979 when the top tax
rate was 70 percent, 20.7 percent in 1988
when the top tax rate was 28 percent, and
20.8 percent in 2003 when the top tax rate
was 35 percent. If it is hard to believe that
lower marginal tax rates had so little impact
on average taxes paid, just wait until we get to
a later section on “taxable income elasticity.”
Capital Gains and 
Stock Options
The treatment of capital gains in studies
of income shares raises many issues. The
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CBO data includes only the portion of capi-
tal gains that shows up on tax returns but
excludes capital gains accruing within tax-
deferred savings accounts, the sizable exclu-
sion of capital gains from home sales since
1997, and capital gains that are unrealized
because the assets are not sold.
Many academic and government studies
have shown that the amount of capital gains
“realized” each year—by selling stock or other
assets—is enormously affected by the top tax
rate on such gains.33 For example, CBO’s esti-
mates show the top 1 percent’s share of expand-
ed income jumping in 1986 to avoid the higher
capital gains tax in 1987. And CBO’s estimates
show the top 1 percent’s share rising sharply
again in 1997–2000, after the top capital gains
tax was cut from 28 to 20 percent.
Piketty and Saez wisely exclude capital gains
from their basic series, but include gains in
another series. The difference between the two
series provides a handy measure of the chang-
ing importance of capital gains.  
Figure 3 shows that a substantial share of
the top 1 percent’s broader income (including
capital gains) consists of capital gains. Changes
in the capital gains share illustrate to some
extent another important example of “income
switching.” There has been substantial switch-
ing between (1) incentive stock options or
restricted stock taxed as a long-term capital
gain and (2) “nonqualified” stock options
reported as salaries when cashed in and taxed at
ordinary income tax rates.
Figure 3 shows that capital gains account-
ed for 18 percent or less of all the broadly
defined income (including those gains)
reported on the top 1 percent of individual
income tax returns in the early 1980s. The
unprecedented spike to a 30.5 percent share
in 1986 was clearly just a matter of timing—
cashing out early to beat the higher 28 per-
cent tax on gains in 1987.  
Starting in 1987, capital gains became a
much smaller portion of the income of the
top 1 percent, dropping to an average of just
7.3 percent for the following 10 years. For
business executives, however, receiving a
smaller share of total compensation from
capital gains (incentive stock options or
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the
United States,” as updated at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez.
restricted stock) can often reflect renegotiat-
ing compensation packages to receive a larg-
er share from salary, bonuses, or nonquali-
fied stock options. Such changes in the form
of executive compensation do not make peo-
ple richer or poorer, but they do affect the
Piketty-Saez estimates because those esti-
mates exclude capital gains.
The top 1 percent received a much larger
share of their income in the form of realized
capital gains from 1979 to 1986 than they
did from 1987 to 1995. That doesn’t mean
that they received less income in the latter
period—only that they received it as nonqual-
ified stock options, salary, or bonus taxed as
salaries rather than as restricted stock or
incentive stock options taxed as capital gains.
Because the Piketty-Saez estimates exclude
capital gains (correctly, in my judgment), this
sort of income switching means that their
estimates from 1979 to 1986 were artificially
depressed (because a larger share of top
incomes came from capital gains and are
therefore not counted) relative to those from
1987 to 1995. And that, in turn, created a
largely illusory increase in the top 1 percent’s
income share between those two periods.
This form of income shifting is yet another
reason why such income share figures cannot
be properly compared before and after 1986.
When the capital gains tax rate was cut
from 28 to 20 percent in 1997, capital gains
rose sharply as a share of the top 1 percent’s
income (Figure 3), before stocks crashed in
2001. But realization is not a meaningful con-
cept of income or a meaningful proxy for unre-
alized capital gains. Selling stock is no different
from selling a house or car—it does not make
anyone wealthier and is not income.
An additional issue is that investor
responses to changes in the capital gains tax
rate create serious problems for tax-return-
based measures of top incomes, regardless of
whether the capital gain is included or not.
The CBO’s income distribution estimates
(which include capital gains) are obviously
distorted by changes in the frequency and
timing of asset sales in response to actual or
anticipated changes in the capital gains tax.
On the other hand, estimates that exclude
reported capital gains (such as Piketty-Saez)
are distorted by another form of income shift-
ing—between compensation reported on
Schedule D as capital gains and compensa-
tion reported on form W-2 as salaries. An
important example is stock options granted
to hundreds of corporate executives and mil-
lions of other employees.
Some stock options are “nonqualified,” and
are reported on W-2 forms as salaries when they
are “exercised” (cashed-in after three years of
vesting but before the 10-year expiration date).
“Incentive stock options,” by contrast, must be
held for a while after they are exercised and are
therefore taxed as long-term capital gains.
Restricted stock is also held for a vesting period
and, with luck, sold as a capital gain.
Economist John Karl Scholz rightly notes
that, “there have been important changes in
compensation in recent years in the U.S.—
namely, there were unusually large increases
in the use of [nonqualified] stock options.
These have been shown by others to be a very
substantial portion of the incomes of top
earners.”34 However, as Carola Frydman and
Raven Saks point out, “because gains from
stock options prior to the 1970s were not
generally taxed as personal income and con-
sequently not recorded on personal income
tax returns, tax returns may provide a biased
estimate of the incomes of top earners.”35
Before 1972, the top tax rate on ordinary
income was 70 percent, so sensible executives
negotiated to receive incentive stock options
(ISOs), taxed at much lower capital gains tax
rates of 25–34 percent. Any gains from non-
qualified stock options granted in 1972 or
later could eventually be taxed at a lower 50
percent rate on “earned income,” but only
after another 3 to 10 years, when they were
vested and exercised. Virtually all gains from
exercising executive stock options before
1980 appeared as capital gains and are there-
fore invisible in 1970s salary data. This is
another reason, in our growing list, why
recent Piketty-Saez data are not comparable
to those of the 1970s.
When the top tax rate on salaries was
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reduced from 50 percent in 1986 to 28 per-
cent in 1988, that provided a huge incentive
to delay cashing in any nonqualified options
until 1988.  That is one reason why salary
income jumped dramatically in 1988. And
because the tax on capital gains also rose
from 20 percent to 28 percent in 1987, that
provided a huge incentive to cash in older
incentive options in 1986. That is why CBO’s
estimates of top income shares, which
include capital gains, spike the most in 1986
rather than 1988. What appears as a big
increase in annual income in both 1986 and
1988 was simply a matter of when income
would be realized. Timing is everything, but
timing isn’t really annual income. 
Because the 1986 tax act slashed tax rates on
salaries and raised the tax rate on capital gains,
it promoted an increasingly wide distribution
of nonqualified options (taxed as salary) and
nearly killed incentive stock options (taxed as
capital gains). The net result was massive
income switching from 1986 to 1988—from
reporting exercised stock options as capital
gains to reporting them as salary income.  
Nonqualified options granted between
1988 and 1992 were not vested until 1991 to
1995, and few were willing or able to exercise
such options in the recession of 1991. By the
time most of such options could be exercised,
it was 1993, and the tax rate had gone up.
That did not indicate that executives don’t
respond to tax rates. It just meant nonquali-
fied stock options can only be exercised 3 to
10 years after they are granted, and, mean-
while, the rules may have changed. 
Most of the executive and non-executive
stock options cashed in during the stock
boom of 1997 to 2000 were counted as
salaries, whereas comparable stock options
in the 1970s were of a different variety that
did not appear in the salary data. As dis-
cussed earlier, tax-return-based income-dis-
tribution estimates from the 1970s are sim-
ply not comparable to data from recent years.
Since executives can choose the timing of
stock option exercises and capital gains real-
izations, they naturally report most of such
income in boom times and very little in
slumps.   The resulting cyclicality of the top 1
percent’s share of reported income makes
this a paradoxical way to define “inequality.”
Recessions increase the poverty rate and
unemployment rate, yet appear to “reduce
inequality” according to this “top 1 percent”
criterion—partly because capital gain realiza-
tions and stock option exercises dry up.
Even in the series without capital gains, the
Piketty-Saez estimates of top 1 percent income
shares always fell, without exception, whenever
the real economy and stock market contracted.
The top 1 percent’s share fell in 1920, 1929–32,
1938, 1949, 1953, 1957–58, 1960, 1970,
1975–76, 1981, 1991, and 2001–2002. If reduc-
ing the top percentile’s share of income was a
sensible policy objective, a dozen recessions
taught us how to do that.
CEOs and Celebrities
Income shifting and other varieties of tax-
able income elasticity are consistent with the
U.S. time series data on top income shares. An
alternative explanation, supported by Piketty
and Saez and others, is that the observed
increases in income reported by the top 1 per-
cent of U.S. taxpayers since the 1970s has been
due to large increases in the pay of chief execu-
tive officers. The market for CEOs is hypothe-
sized to be limited to English-speaking coun-
tries, which is thought to explain why top
income shares rose more dramatically in those
countries than in France or Japan. According to
Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon, “CEOs
together with sports and entertainment stars
explain what is going on in the top 1 percent of
the income distribution.”36
There are now more than 1.4 million U.S. tax-
payers in the top 1 percent. The only evidence that
Piketty and Saez offer to suggest that the average
income of those 1.4 million could be explained by
CEO pay is an annually changing sample of the
top 100 CEOs (those who happen to exercise old
stock options in any particular year). Yet the
Piketty-Saez estimates of average pay for that elite
100 fell by more than 54 percent from the year
2000 to 2003 (from $40.4 million to $18.5 mil-
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lion apiece).37 That huge decline in top CEO pay
was certainly not matched by a comparable drop
in the estimated income share of the top 1 per-
cent.  But there was no reason to expect it to have
had much impact, since the combined incomes
of the top 100 CEOs in 2003 was only $1.85 bil-
lion—just two-tenths of 1 percent of the $886.5
billion that Piketty and Saez attributed to the top
1 percent.
Figure 4 shows that the rise and fall of pay
among the Standard & Poor’s 500 chief exec-
utives, as calculated by Lucian Bebchuk and
Yaniv Grinstein, was closely tied to the rise
and fall of the S&P 500 index itself, which
proves the vast majority of CEO pay at the
biggest firms is tightly tied to stock perfor-
mance (up to 78 percent of top 100 pay was
stock-based in a Piketty-Saez sample).38
Top CEO pay is clearly insufficient to
account for the level or growth of income
among the top percentile. The proliferation
of nonqualified stock options among several
million non-executive employees in the
1990s is a far more plausible explanation of
the obvious 1997–2003 link between the
stock market’s ups and downs and the unad-
justed Piketty-Saez estimates of top per-
centile shares. Estimated income shares of
the top 1 percent soared with the stock mar-
ket in 1997–2000 and then fell with the mar-
ket in 2001–2003. That was even true of esti-
mates that excluded taxable capital gains,
which suggests the link between top per-
centile pay and stock prices was dominated
by nonqualified stock options.   
Reported Income Depends
on Marginal Tax Rates
The numerator of the ratio of top
incomes to total incomes has been seriously
corrupted by tax-induced income shifting
from the corporate tax to the individual tax,
from taxable to tax-favored savings accounts,
and from stock options taxed as capital gains
to stock options taxed as salary. Yet this sort
of income shifting is merely a partial mani-
festation of a broader phenomenon—namely,
the elasticity of taxable income.  
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Policy 21, no. 2 (2005).
Reductions in marginal tax rates may
induce people to alter their taxable income in
many ways. Executives may negotiate for
shares in their companies, for example,
rather than receiving cozy salaries and tax-
exempt perks.39 Entrepreneurs may start
more businesses, spouses of high-bracket
taxpayers may join the labor force, those pre-
viously working in the underground cash
economy may take jobs that require taxes to
be paid, skilled professionals may work hard-
er and retire later, executives may negotiate
for cash rather than perks, high-income
investors may hold fewer tax-exempt bonds
and trade stocks more frequently, taxpayers
may not try so hard to maximize tax deduc-
tions and adjustments.40
More than a dozen highly-regarded stud-
ies have shown that the amount of income
reported by those facing the highest margin-
al tax rates is extremely sensitive to changes
in those rates. This responsiveness goes by
the cumbersome name of “taxable income
elasticity.” The elasticity of taxable income
refers to how much reported income will
change when marginal tax rates are changed.
Economist Wojciech Kopczuk came up
with an estimated elasticity of 0.53 for all tax-
payers.41 The Federal Reserve’s Adam Looney
and Harvard’s Monica Singhal “estimate a
significant elasticity of family labor income
of 0.75 for families with base-year earnings
between $35,000 and $85,000.”42
Studies that focus on taxpayers in the high-
est tax brackets generally find higher elasticities,
which seems logical. At the lower end of the
range for such estimates is a study by Jon
Gruber and Emmanuel Saez, which found that
“taxpayers who have incomes above $100,000
per year . . . have an elasticity of 0.57.” 43
At the high end, Harvard’s Martin Feldstein
recently reported that estimates for high-
income taxpayers show that “the elasticity of
income with respect to one-minus-the-mar-
ginal-tax rate is about one.”44 Thus, if the top
tax rate drops from 40 to 30 percent, the
amount of every extra dollar a taxpayer gets
to keep (one minus the marginal tax rate)
would rise by nearly 17 percent—from 60 to
70 percent. An elasticity of one means that
the amount of income reported would also
rise by 17 percent. In place of an extra $100
taxed at 40 percent ($40), the IRS would
receive $117 taxed at 30 percent ($35).
The point is that all of these estimates of
taxable income elasticity, including two by
Emmanuel Saez, predict that a substantial
reduction of top tax rates should be followed
by a very substantial increase in the amount
of income reported on tax returns by high-
income taxpayers.  And that is exactly what
happened when U.S. tax rates on salaries
(and S-corporation profits) were sharply
reduced after 1986. According to Emmanuel
Saez, “income shares within the top 1 percent
show striking evidence of large and immedi-
ate responses to the tax cuts of the 1980s, and
the size of those responses is largest for the
very top income groups.”45
With the capital gains tax, the estimates of
taxable income elasticity are generally higher,
averaging at least 0.9 among a dozen leading
studies.46 That implies that reported income
from realized capital gains should have been
expected to increase substantially just after the
U.S. capital gains tax was reduced from 28 per-
cent to 20 percent in 1997. And Figure 3 shows
that that is exactly what happened (partly
because of income switching).
Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez found a
surge in dividend payouts following the 2003
reduction in the top U.S. dividend tax rate
from 35 to 15 percent.47 Between 2002 and
2004, the amount of dividend income report-
ed on individual tax returns nearly doubled—
dividends increased from $103.2 billion in
2002 to $198.8 billion in 2004.48 Under the
plausible assumption that a large fraction of
the dividends were reported by high-bracket
taxpayers, the reduction of the dividend tax
from 35 to 15 percent helps account for the
otherwise anomalous magnitude of the
Piketty-Saez estimate on income shares
(Table 2) for 2004. But these higher dividend
payouts mainly represent income shifting.
After the dividend tax was cut, a smaller
share of corporate income was retained or
used for stock buybacks, so more profits were
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paid out to stockholders and reported as tax-
able individual income. And a greatly
reduced portion of dividend-paying stocks
was held in tax-deferred accounts or by tax-
exempt foundations and institutions, while a
larger share was willingly held by investors
happy to pay a 15 percent tax (yet easily able
to avoid a 35 percent tax).
Despite all the evidence from Saez and oth-
ers that taxable income elasticity is enormously
significant for high-income taxpayers, for capi-
tal gains realizations, and for the taxable por-
tion of dividends, Piketty and Saez were
nonetheless strangely puzzled that “while top
income shares have remained fairly stable in
continental European countries or Japan over
the past three decades, they have increased
enormously in the United States and other
English-speaking countries.”49 Yet that is exact-
ly what all the estimates of taxable income elas-
ticity should lead us to expect. “While progres-
sivity has unambiguously declined in the
United States and in the United Kingdom,”
note Piketty and Saez, “it has increased some-
what in France.” 
We should have expected top income
shares to have remained stable in France (and
Japan) but to have increased enormously in
the U.S. and other countries that cut tax rates
sharply. Countries that cut top marginal tax
rates in half, such as the United States, the
United Kingdom, India, and New Zealand,
experienced the largest increases in reported
pretax income among top income groups.
Countries that cut marginal tax rates less
aggressively, such as Canada and Australia,
experienced significant yet less dramatic
increases in reported top income shares. And
those countries that kept combined national
and local income tax rates near 50 percent,
such as Japan and France, did not experience
a significant increase in top income shares.
These international comparisons are entirely
consistent with U.S. estimates of taxable
income elasticity.50 They show that having
the top 1 percent report more income or cap-
ital gains on tax returns, simply because the
tax penalty for doing so came down, says
more about how people react to tax rates on
added income than it does about how much
income or wealth (such as unrealized capital
gains) they actually have. 
Income Trends  
since the 1970s
The widespread impression that the
United States has experienced a large and
continuous increase in income inequality
since the 1970s is almost entirely dependent
on the disingenuous practice of using esti-
mates based on income tax returns to com-
pare the distribution of incomes before and
after the dramatic tax changes of 1981 and
1986. If the Piketty and Saez estimates actu-
ally demonstrated a continuous and credible
upward trend toward greater inequality since
the late-1980s, all other estimates of income
distribution would have to be wrong—
including those of the Census Bureau, the
CBO, and the Federal Reserve Board.
In a recent column, Paul Krugman com-
plained about “the amount of time that inequal-
ity’s apologists spend attacking a claim nobody
is making: that there has been a clear long-term
decline in middle-class living standards.”51 Yet,
in a 2004 column Krugman said, “according to
estimates by the economists Thomas Piketty
and Emmanuel Saez—confirmed by data from
the CBO—between 1973 and 2000 the average
real income of the bottom 90 percent of
American taxpayers actually fell by 7 percent.”52
For Krugman to assert that there was a 7
percent drop in real income for 90 percent of
taxpayers over 27 years certainly sounds like a
“clear long-term decline in middle-class living
standards.” To question such claims requires
no straw man. On the contrary, Krugman’s
astonishingly incorrect assertion provided an
excellent example of how remarkably uncritical
even professional economists have become
toward the Piketty-Saez estimates.
Piketty and Saez recently acknowledged that,
“our long-run series are generally confined to
top income and wealth shares and contain little
information about bottom segments of the dis-
tribution.”53 Yet one of their figures from their
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2001 paper (Figure A-1) encouraged the exact
opposite impression. The figure appeared to
show 27 years of real income stagnation (not
decline) for the bottom 99 percent of taxpayers
rather than Krugman’s bottom 90 percent. In a
key footnote to that graph, however, they
explain that “from 1973 to 2000, the average
income of the bottom 99 percent would have
grown by about 40 percent in real terms instead
of stagnating (as displayed in the figure above) if
we had included all transfers (+7% effect), used
the CPI-U-RS (+13% effect), and especially
defined income per capita (20% effect).”54 That
40 percent increase in per capita real income for
the bottom 99 percent makes it quite impossible
that income of the bottom 90 percent of
American taxpayers “actually fell by 7 percent,”
as Krugman wrote.
CBO’s estimates began in 1979, not 1973,
and they certainly do not “confirm” what
Piketty and Saez deny (in the footnote). Between
1979 and 2000, the CBO estimates indicate that
the average real income of the bottom 80 per-
cent of American taxpayers rose by 12 percent
before taxes and by 15 percent after taxes.55 Real
after-tax income of the middle quintile rose
from $38,900 in 1979 (in 2003 dollars) to
$44,700 in 2000, according to the CBO.
Census Bureau estimates of mean house-
hold income among the bottom four quin-
tiles rose from $32,786 in 1973 (in 2005 dol-
lars) to $40,640 in 2000.56 That is, Census
estimates show a 24 percent real increase for
the bottom 80 percent—with all of that gain
occurring since 1982.  In fact, the Census esti-
mates show an accelerating pace of gains
among the bottom 80 percent, with real
income in that group rising 7.6 percent from
1970 to 1980, 9.6 percent from 1980 to 1990,
and 12.4 percent from 1990 to 2000.57
Aside from the Piketty-Saez comparisons of
top income shares before and after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, there is surprisingly little
U.S. evidence of any significant and sustained
increase in inequality of income, wealth, wages,
or consumption since the late 1980s. 
The Census Bureau’s conventional measure
of household income distribution (which
excludes taxes and transfer payments) shows lit-
tle change in recent years aside from a one-time
jump in 1993 when “a change in survey method-
ology led to a sharp rise in measured inequali-
ty.”58 Figure 5 shows that the top 5 percent’s
share of family income was virtually constant in
recent years, drifting between 20 percent and 21
percent from 1993 to 2004. The Census esti-
mates are in marked contrast to the Piketty-Saez
estimates for the top 5 percent of tax units,
which were much higher than the conventional
Census figures (even though both series exclude
capital gains and transfer payments) and fluctu-
ated much more with the stock market and with
changes in business income reported on indi-
vidual tax returns. The Census estimates of the
share of income received by the top 5 percent
cast considerable doubt on the much higher
and more volatile Piketty-Saez series, for reasons
this paper explains.
The Census Bureau also uses Gini coeffi-
cients to measure broad changes in inequality.
Larger Gini coefficients indicate increased
inequality. Despite the break in the data in
1993, as noted, the Bureau’s Gini coefficient for
after-tax post-transfer household income (which
is the way most other countries measure
inequality) has not increased—it was .409 in
1986, .398 in 1993, and .394 in 2002–2003.59
Note that the post-tax, post-transfer
Census Bureau Gini coefficients are based on
mean income by quintile. But mean income
for, say, the top 5–20 percent is always much
larger than median income because, unlike
other income groups, top groups have no
income ceiling to exclude extreme outliers
(such as a hedge fund manager earning a bil-
lion dollars in one year). This makes it mis-
leading to compare changes of mean income
between top income groups and other quin-
tiles or deciles.
Table 4 compares real median income by
income group from the periodic Federal Reserve
Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances.60
Between 1989 to 2004 the increase in real medi-
an income for the top two deciles was about 20
percent—essentially identical to the increase for
the bottom two quintiles.
The common impression that the United
States remains in the midst of a large and persis-
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tent 20-year increase in income inequality is also
inconsistent with measures of consumption or
wage inequality. A 2005 study published by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the
Gini coefficient for a broad measure of consump-
tion inequality was 0.283 in 1986, 0.293 in 1990,
0.294 in 1994, 0.281 in 1999, and 0.280 in 2001.61
The most recent two figures show less inequality
of living standards (consumption) than in 1986.
Economists Wojciech Kopczuk and
Emmanuel Saez examined the inequality of
wealth. They concluded that in the 1980s,
“top wealth shares increased only to the lev-
els prevailing prior to the recessions of the
1970s. Furthermore, this increase took place
in the early 1980s and top shares were stable
during the 1990s.”62
In another study, economists David Card
and John DiNardo found that wage inequality
did not increase before 1980 and that 85 per-
cent of the increase during the 1980s hap-
pened before 1985, concluding that “none of
the three series [measuring wage differences]
. . . shows a noticeable change in inequality
between 1988 and 2000.” 63
Most measures do show some increase in
the inequality of income, wages, wealth, and
consumption between 1981 and 1986. But
1981 was an atypical base year with acute
stagflation and severely depressed stock and
bond prices.
Conclusions
The many changes in U.S. tax rules since
1980 have made a dramatic difference in
what is reported as income on individual tax
returns. One result is that it is misleading, if
not meaningless, to compare income report-
ed on tax returns in the 1970s and 1980s
with data reported in recent years.
The estimated ratio of top percentile U.S.
incomes to total incomes has been distorted by
tax-induced changes to both the numerator
and the denominator. The amount of business
income reported on individual income tax
returns by the top 1 percent rose from 7.8 in
1981 to 28.4 percent in 2004, following sharp
reductions in individual income tax rates enact-
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census household income data, www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/
h03ar.html; and Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States,” as updated at
http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/saez.
ed in 1981 and 1986. Corporate executives
switched from accepting stock options taxed as
capital gains to nonqualified stock options
reported and taxed as salaries, and those newly
popular stock options were distributed to mil-
lions of non-executives. 
Estimates of the elasticity of taxable income
among high-income taxpayers range from 0.56
to 1.0, implying that large increases in reported
income should be observed when tax rates are
cut. And that is what occurred in countries that
cut top tax rates in half, such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and
India. Estimates of the elasticity of reported
income from capital gains cluster near 0.9,
implying large increases in reported income
from capital gains should have been observed
(as they were) after the U.S. capital gains tax rate
was cut in the early 1980s, in 1997, and in 2003.
This paper estimates that simply includ-
ing transfer payments in the denominator of
the Piketty-Saez data reduces the top per-
centile’s income share in 2004 from 16.1 per-
cent to 13.1 percent. Just one form of income
shifting—business income from corporate to
individual returns—added another three per-
centage points to the share reported by the
top 1 percent. The adjusted estimates show
no increase in the top 1 percent’s income
share between 1988 and 2003.  The top 1 per-
cent’s income share rose in 2004 based on the
Piketty-Saez interpolated estimate, but that
appears to be partly explained by the near
doubling of dividend income reported after
the sharp dividend tax cut of 2003.
There is still much to be uncovered with
respect to data on income shares, however.
With respect to top percentile incomes, this
paper did not attempt to estimate the size of
tax shifting between stock options taxed as
capital gains in the 1970s and those taxed as
salary in the 1990s.
Most importantly, this paper just begins
to focus attention on the large magnitude of
shifting between taxable savings in the 1970s
and tax-favored savings, such as in 401(k)s,
today. Many new and expanded savings plans
resulted in much of the dividends, interest
income, and capital gains of middle-income
taxpayers disappearing from tax returns,
leaving only the investment income of afflu-
ent investors visible in the data. This paper
makes no effort to estimate the magnitude of
this disappearance, yet it is clearly very large
and growing rapidly.
In sum, studies of changes in income dis-
tribution based on tax return data provide
distorted and misleading comparisons of
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Table 4
Real Pretax Median Household Income (in 2004 dollars)
Percentile Percent Change
of Income 1989 2004 1989–2004
0 to 20 9,173 11,100 21.0
20 to 40 21,439 25,700 19.9
40 to 60 38,292 43,200 12.8
60 to 80 59,731 68,100 14.0
80 to 90 87,250 104,700 20.0
90 to 100 153,168 184,800 20.7
Source: Federal Reserve Board, “Survey of Consumer Finances,” www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/scfind
ex.html. 
Note: The 1989 figures were converted to 2004 dollars using the CPI-U.
U.S. income shares because of dramatic
changes in tax laws in recent decades. Aside
from changes in taxpayer reporting due to
changes in the tax laws,  there is no clear evi-
dence of a significant and sustained increase
in the inequality of U.S. incomes, wages, con-
sumption, or wealth since the late 1980s.
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